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Proposed reform of EU
sovereign debt rules
The European Union’s regulations governing sovereign debt
are based on the principle of equal treatment of all member
states. The recommendations we make here concerning
changes in European Union sovereign-debt reduction rules
take account of national particularities, but are by no means
arbitrary in nature. According to the calculations we present
here, such reformed regulations would do far more to pro-
mote economic growth than would be the case under the
Fiscal Compact’s European debt brake. By 2030, real gains
in growth will amount to more than 450 billion euros more
than the outcome that would presumably be obtained un-
der the European debt brake.
Focus
For a hypothetical member state whose
sovereign debt is currently 90 percent of
nominal GDP and with projected GDP
growth of 4 percent a year, our proposed
debt rule would allow for a mean annual
deficit ratio of 1.2 percent. Hence such a
member state could achieve a govern-
ment-debt ratio of 60 percent of nominal
GDP within around 18 years.
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The maximum levels to which sovereign
debt should be allowed to rise has long
been a subject of intense debate among
both economists and political leaders, who
have yet to reach a consensus view on the
matter. However, there is general agree-
ment that a total ban on sovereign debt
would be as economically absurd as pro-
hibiting companies and individuals from
taking out loans (see SVR 2007, p. 1).
Likewise there is consensus that excessive
sovereign debt is undesirable, for sooner
or later it is bound to seriously restrict
government economic policy leeway and
could eventually lead to sovereign default.
Moreover, empirical studies have shown
that sovereign debt exceeding 80 to 90
percent of nominal GDP is a drag on eco-
nomic growth, and thus of course on em-
ployment (see for example Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2010).
The Maastricht Treaty stipulates that total
annual government deficits are not to ex-
ceed 3 percent of nominal GDP, and that
total sovereign debt is not to exceed 60
percent of GDP. There is no particular
economic justification for this rule, for as
one study put it: “From the get-go it is by
no means clear, for example, whether a
government-debt ratio of 30 percent is
‘better’ or ‘worse’ than a 70 percent gov-
ernment-debt ratio” (SVR 2007, p. 29).
However, as the box below shows, there
are definitional correlations between a
member state’s government-debt ratio,
deficit ratio, and GDP growth rate (see text
box).
A government’s deficit ratio will unavoid-
ably be subject to a ceiling insofar as the
government (a) promulgates a specific
maximum government-debt ratio; and (b)
bases its economic policies on a projected
long-term GDP growth rate. The 60 per-
cent limit on sovereign debt stipulated by
the Maastricht Treaty back in 1992 was
Computation procedure for the three-percent deficit rule: The government-debt ratio
(v) for a given year is defined as the ratio between total sovereign debt (V) and GDP for
such year: [v =
V
GDP]. Sovereign debt as at end of any given year is composed of the total
sovereign debt for the prior year (V) and the current deficit (D). The effort to achieve a
constant government-debt ratio is thus characterized by the following equation: [
V
GDP =
V + D
(1 + g) . GDP = v = constant], where: g = the GDP growth rate; or put another way: [(1 + g)
. V
GDP =
V + D
GDP =
V
GDP +
D
GDP]. It thus follows that [(1 + g) v = v + d], whereby the deficit ratio is [d =
D
GDP].
When multiplied out the following result is obtained [v + g . v = v + d] and [g . v = d] and [v =
d
g].
The latter two expressions characterize the relationship that is established by definition
between long term government-debt ratios (v), long term growth of nominal GDP (g), and
the allowable long term deficit ratio (d). With 5 percent growth in nominal GDP (g = 0.05)
and a target government-debt ratio of 60 percent (v = 0.6), the maximum allowable deficit
ratio is 3 percent, whereby [d = g . v = 0.05 . 0.6 = 0.03]. But if nominal GDP increases by only
2 percent, the allowable long term deficit ratio is only 1.2 percent [0.02 · 0.6 = 0.012].
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spective nominal GDP values. This calcu-
lation yielded a government-debt ratio fig-
ure of roughly 60 percent. In combination
with a GDP growth rate at the time of
around 5 percent, a 3 percent figure for
the allowable deficit ratio was arrived at.
This three-percent criterion was the sole
basis for determining whether a given
member state had violated the European
Union’s sovereign debt rules.
2. Sovereign debt trends
in the European Union
Sovereign debt had risen dramatically in
the vast majority of European Union states
even before the worldwide financial and
economic crisis struck in 2008, largely
owing to member states’ failure to stick to
the Maastricht Treaty’s three percent an-
nual government deficit ceiling. But even
if every European Union member state
had adhered to the three percent limit, the
sovereign debt of many of these countries
would have exceeded 60 percent of GDP
anyway. This is attributable to the fact that
the low economic growth in these states in
recent years would have been insufficient
to stabilize their ratio of sovereign debt to
GDP, even if they had adhered to the defi-
cit ceiling. For example, Germany’s deficit
ratio was supposed to have averaged less
than 2 percent of GDP between 1993 and
2012.
The European Union is attempting to
bring the mushrooming sovereign debt of
EU member states under control via a new
instrument, the Fiscal Compact (formally,
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance in the Economic and Mone-
tary Union) of 2 March 2012, which calls
for all signatory states to impose a cap on
national debt comprising a maximum
structural deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP.
The treaty defines the structural deficit as
a given state’s sovereign debt, after adjust-
ing for cyclical fluctuations and temporary
measures. In cases where a member
state’s sovereign debt is significantly be-
low 60 percent of GDP, the maximum al-
lowable structural deficit is 1 percent of
GDP (see CEP 2012, p. 1). Thus, this re-
striction on sovereign debt makes no al-
lowance whatsoever for the economic par-
ticularities of a given member state.
3. Recommended reform
of the European Union’s
sovereign debt rules
The reform we recommend here – which
would promote long term stabilization of
the finances of European Union member
states, while taking account of the eco-
nomic particularities of each such state –
would involve the following: The maxi-
mum sovereign debt amounting to 60 per-
cent of GDP promulgated by the Maas-
tricht Treaty would remain in place. For
despite the absence of an economic ra-
tionale for this figure, it has become a cor-
nerstone of the public debate on sovereign
debt and is thus easier to implement. Also,
the 60 percent criterion serves as a fire-
wall for sovereign debt amounting to 80 to
90 percent of GDP – a rate that is a drag
on economic growth. As long as any
member state’s sovereign debt is less than
60 percent of GDP, the 3 percent mark for
its annual deficit can be adhered to. More-
over, insofar as a 60 percent ratio of sov-
ereign debt to GDP is deemed sustainable,
there is no reason to impose more strin-
gent sovereign debt rules on member
states whose debt level is lower than this
ratio.
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the government-debt ratio be reduced
should kick in that allows for the differ-
ences in economic conditions from one
member state to another. Under our pro-
posed reform, in addition to determining
maximum allowable annual deficit ratios,
the amount of time it would presumably
take for a member state to reach a gov-
ernment-debt ratio of 60 percent of GDP
would also be factored into the equation.
This timeline would in turn be ascertained
by determining allowable deficit ratios, so
as to ultimately achieve member state
government-debt ratio convergence to 30
percent of GDP.
Far from being a target, the sole purpose
of this 30 percent parameter is to deter-
mine at which juncture a given member
state reaches the targeted 60 percent gov-
ernment-debt ratio. The 30 percent figure
was selected because our simulations
show that a putative 30 percent govern-
ment-debt ratio convergence constitutes a
reasonable compromise between the goal
of reducing sovereign debt with all due
speed while at the same allowing reason-
able consolidation needs to be met. The so
called structural deficit (determined by
positing that the government-debt ratio
will be 30 percent and that nominal GDP
will increase over the long term) indicates
the maximum allowable deficit ratio that
would be necessary to achieve a putative
sovereign debt amounting to 30 percent of
GDP. Our proposed reform rests on the as-
sumption that long term GDP growth will
be on a par with average economic growth
over the prior five years. But during eco-
nomic crises, economic growth over the
previous five years is a highly unreliable
basis for such projections. Hence in de-
termining structural deficit ratios, we es-
timated the long term nominal growth
rates for the calculations described below
and – contrary to one of the basic princi-
ples of our proposed sovereign debt regu-
lation reform – based on the growth rates
of the past ten years and the long term
projections in Prognos-Weltreport. Thus for
example, a member state with a long term
4 percent GDP growth rate is deemed to
have attained the requisite structural defi-
cit ratio of 1.2 percent (d = v . g = 0.3 .
0.04 = 0.012). The time it takes for a given
member state to reach a government-debt
ratio of 60 percent will be determined by
the state’s baseline sovereign debt. For
example, it would take a member state –
with sovereign debt amounting to 90 per-
cent of GDP and with a nominal economic
growth rate of 4 percent – around 18
years to reach a 60 percent government-
debt ratio (see graph on p. 1). Under our
reform, this consolidation phase would
constitute a legally binding set period dur-
ing which the allowable deficit ratio would
be adjusted if the GDP growth rate devi-
ates from the projected rate. However, in-
stead of being determined on the basis of
the structural deficit alone, the maximum
allowable government deficit would be
higher during economic downturns; and
this in turn would have to be offset by
lower allowable deficits during economic
upturns. The attendant “cyclical deficit ra-
tio” would be determined on the basis of
the cyclical component, as follows: cyclical
component = (potential output – projected
GDP) . budget sensitivity, which indicates
the extent to which a national budget is
determined by GDP; it is determined at
regular intervals by the European Com-
mission in accordance with OECD re-
quirements (also see Girouard and André
2005). The projected GDP is based on the
European Commission’s current economic
forecasts.
The economic crisis that struck in 2008
has demonstrated in no uncertain terms
that both public and private indebtedness
can induce sweeping economic upheavals.
However, the problem with private-sector
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scenarios. The simulations in our study encompassed
the world’s 42 states that account for more than 90
percent of the world economy and were based on the
following parameters: supply and demand; labour
markets; government finances; as well as exports,
imports, currency rates and so on. Thus, the model
also factors in the interrelationships between the
various states as regards these parameters.
debt is that it is completely
uncontrollable as it is the out-
come of countless individual
decisions. Our proposed re-
form takes account of both
government and current-
account deficits, in order to be
able to counteract macroeco-
nomic imbalances. To this
end, current-account deficits
would be limited to 4 percent
of GDP.
4. How our proposed re-
form would stimulate
economic growth
Cutbacks in government expenditures on
goods and services reduce overall demand
and provoke sales losses. And when com-
panies are then forced to pare down pro-
duction and lay off workers, this in turn
impacts on government finances, reduces
tax and social security revenue, and forces
the government to spend more on unem-
ployment
benefits.
Hence it is es-
sential that
government-
revenue losses
be taken into
account in de-
vising policies
aimed at re-
ducing sover-
eign debt; for
a sudden drop
in government
expenditures
on goods and
services can
be counter-
productive
and can increase sovereign debt even fur-
ther. In the interest of estimating the im-
pact of our proposed sovereign debt re-
forms on the various member states’
economies and the world economy as a
whole, we conducted a simulation using
Prognos’s macroeconomic VIEW model
(see text box).
We devised a sovereign debt reduction so-
lution based on the 2010 data for Euro-
pean Union member states whose gov-
ernment-debt ratio exceeds 60 percent of
nominal GDP. In other words, we deter-
mined the maximum allowable structural
deficit ratio and the number of years it
would take for a given country to bring
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our proposed reform would allow these
member states an altogether higher deficit
ratio than the European Union’s 0.5 per-
cent debt reduction figure, and would af-
ford them more economic policy leeway.
The differences in the maximum allowable
structural deficit ratios in our plan are at-
tributable to differences in projected
nominal economic growth for the national
economies.
Table 2 displays the differences in eco-
nomic development that would result from
the Fiscal Compact’s European debt brake
versus our proposed reform. These figures
were arrived at by simulating what would
happen if, in the run-up to 2030, all Euro-
pean Union member states adopted fiscal
policies that were consistent with our pro-
posed reform. We then compared the re-
sults of this simulation with those of a
simulation of the putative outcome if all
European Union member states adhered
to the stipulations of the Fiscal Compact
between 2011 and 2030. This comparison
shows that by 2030, cumulative real
growth would outpace by more than 450
billion euros the outcome that would be
obtained under the current European debt
brake. These 450 billion euros would, for
example, enable the European Union to
finance 65 percent of the capital for the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), or
underwrite Greece’s entire sovereign debt
as at December 2011 amounting to around
355 billion euros – and with enough left
over to finance 55 percent of Portugal’s
sovereign debt as at this same date.
While our results re-
vealed unfavourable
evolutions in a few
member states, they
would be of brief du-
ration and in the long
run our proposed
sovereign debt
framework would
promote economic
growth in all Euro-
pean Union member
states (see text box).
Germany’s economy
is closely interlinked
with other EU coun-
tries’ economies.
Which is why Ger-
many would stand to
benefit most from our
proposed sovereign
debt regulation
framework, as eco-
nomic growth in our
partner countries
would increase.
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Conclusion
Adhering to a maximum allowable gov-
ernment-debt ratio of 60 percent of GDP
would make it necessary for many Euro-
pean Union member states to reduce their
sovereign debt. In contrast, the approach
to reducing sovereign debt that we pro-
pose here has the virtue of being clear and
simple; plus it makes allowances for the
economic particularities of individual
member states without being arbitrary.
Moreover, our proposal will stimulate eco-
nomic growth far more than will be the
case with the inflexible sovereign debt re-
duction regime imposed by the Fiscal
Compact. And finally, rules that allow the
European Union member states more time
to reduce their sovereign debt and that
take account of the particularities of indi-
vidual economies are also in Germany’s
interests; for as a major export nation, we
do not want the economic growth of our
European Union trading partners to be
hampered by unduly
large cutbacks in gov-
ernment spending.
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Transitional rules and their possible consequences: The
transitional rules of the European debt brake call for incre-
mental government deficit ratio reductions over a six year
transitional period, as is being done in Germany. In con-
trast, our proposed framework calls for proportionally
higher structural-deficit reductions at the beginning of a
likewise six year period. The rationale for this distinction
and the attendant proposed reform is that transitional-rule
largess during a set consolidation period would inevitably
result in needlessly stringent consolidation requirements –
particularly in light of the unusually high deficit ratios that
we saw in 2010. Hence in the final analysis our proposed
regime is more stringent than that of the Fiscal Compact’s
European debt brake. And while this would be a drag on
economic growth, our framework would at the same time
promote economic growth in that it would allow for lower
government-debt ratios and deficit ratios that take account
of the economic conditions in individual member states.
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/05 Policy Brief 2012/03: Shaping Sustainable EconomiesA society acts sustainably if it ensures the long-term stability
and productivity of ecological, sociopolitical and economic
systems. In the past, issues of sustainability were typically
handled separately, neglecting individual measures’ effects
on other elements implied by a comprehensive concept of
sustainability. The challenge ahead is to develop a holistic
strategy for sustainable economic activity that takes into ac-
count interdependencies between the various aspects of
sustainability, and does not seek to solve problems of sustai-
nability at other aspects’ expense.
Policy Brief 2012/04: A Modern Social Market Economy
The new MSME Index defines and measures the features of
a Modern Social Market Economy in international compari-
son. In contrast to other indices that measure economic per-
formance, the MSME Index takes an institutional approach,
outlining a system of essential institutions and measurable
indicators for the construction and assessment of modern
social market economies. Among other insights, the index
could guide the European Union toward achieving the
“highly competitive social market economy” that it defines
in the Lisbon Treaty as its desired economic order.
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